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Automobile Liability: The Nebraska
Range of Vision Rule
Vrba v. Kelly, 198 Neb. 723, 225 N.W.2d 269 (1977);
C.C. Natvigs' Sons, Inc. v. Summers, 198 Neb. 741,
255 N.W.2d 272 (1977).
I. INTRODUCTION
In Vrba v. Kelly' and C.C. Natvig's Sons, Inc. v. Summers,2 the
Supreme Court of Nebraska again considered the legal effect of the
range of vision rule in automobile liability cases. The Court reiter-
ated its adherence to this rule, and in so doing, attempted to
specifically define the respective roles of the judge and the jury in
applying the rule.
As it has been developed by the court, the range of vision doc-
trine can be stated as follows: As a general rule, it is negligence as
a matter of law for a motorist to drive an automobile on a highway
in such a manner that he cannot stop or turn aside in time to avoid
a collision with an object within the range of his vision.3 The basis
for the rule is that automobile drivers are legally obligated to keep
such a lookout that they can see what is plainly visible before
them, and they cannot relieve themselves of that duty. Addition-
1. 198 Neb. 723, 255 N.W.2d 269 (1977).
2. 198 Neb. 741, 255 N.W.2d 272 (1977).
3. See, e.g., C.C. Natvig's Sons, Inc. v. Summers, 198 Neb. 741, 255 N.W.2d 272
(1977); Vrba v. Kelly, 198 Neb. 723, 255 N.W.2d 269 (1977); Mays v. Siekman,
197 Neb. 77, 247 N.W.2d 613 (1976); Duling v. Berryman, 193 Neb. 409, 227
N.W.2d 584 (1975); Wrasse v. Gustavson, 193 Neb. 41, 225 N.W.2d 274 (1975);
Botsch v. Reisdorff; 193 Neb. 165, 226 N.W.2d 121 (1975); McClellen v. Dobber-
stein, 189 Neb. 669,204 N.W.2d 559 (1973); O'Connor v. Kientz, 184 Neb. 554, 168
N.W.2d 703 (1969).
The rule also applies to driving at night. In these cases the rule is that it is
negligence, as a matter of law, for motorists to drive on highways in such a
manner that they cannot stop or turn aside in time to avoid a collision with an
object within the range of their headlights. See, e.g., Robins v. Sandoz, 177
Neb. 894, 131 N.W.2d 648 (1964); Robins v. Sandoz, 175 Neb. 5, 120 N.W.2d 360
(1963); Miers v. McMaken, 147 Neb. 133, 22 N.W.2d 422 (1946); Roth v. Blom-
quist, 117 Neb. 444, 220 N.W. 572 (1928).
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ally, they must drive their automobiles so that when they see an
object, they can stop their automobile or turn aside in time to avoid
it. The effect of this rule in automobile negligence cases is to re-
move the question of a driver's negligence from the jury, with the
judge applying the rule as a matter of law. The rationale is that
where a driver of an automobile collides with an object which is
clearly visible, reasonable minds could not differ on the issue of
the driver's negligence; therefore, this issue is not to be submitted
to the jury.
As with most specific rules of law in a negligence context, the
range of vision rule in Nebraska is not without exceptions. The
court, however, has not been entirely clear in articulating those sit-
uations in which the rule will apply or when instead an exception
will apply. On several occasions the court has stated that where
reasonable minds could differ as to whether an operator of an auto-
mobile was exercising the care, caution, and prudence of a reason-
ably careful, cautious person, the rule does not apply and the
question of negligence is for the jury.5 Yet in other situations the
court has suggested that the rule is inapplicable only in situations
in which the object struck was not plainly visible to the driver of
the automobile.
6
If the standard that the question is for the judge unless reason-
able minds could differ is, in fact, the proper interpretation of the
range of vision rule, then it is interesting to contrast this with the
normal standard for deciding whether a question of negligence is
for the jury or for the court. The normal standard is that the ques-
tion of negligence is for the jury, but if reasonable minds could not
differ as to whether a person was exercising the care, caution, and
prudence of a reasonably careful, cautious person, the judge de-
cides the driver's negligence as a matter of law.7 However, when
the range of vision rule is involved, the initial determination is for
4. See Stanley v. Ebmeier, 166 Neb. 716, 90 N.W.2d 290 (1958); Bramhall v. Ad-
cock, 162 Neb. 198, 75 N.W.2d 696 (1956).
5. See Bartosh v. Schlautman, 181 Neb. 130,147 N.W.2d 492 (1966); Robins v. San-
doz, 177 Neb. 894, 131 N.W.2d 648 (1964); Robins v. Sandoz, 175 Neb. 5, 120
N.W.2d 360 (1963); Thurow v. Schaeffer, 151 Neb. 651, 38 N.W.2d 732 (1949);
Miers v. McMaken, 147 Neb. 133,22 N.W.2d 422 (1946); Fulcher v. Ike, 142 Neb.
418, 6 N.W.2d 610 (1942).
6. See C.C. Natvig's Sons, Inc. v. Summers, 198 Neb. 741, 255 N.W.2d 272 (1977);
Vrba v. Kelly, 198 Neb. 723, 255 N.W.2d 269 (1977); Kehm v. Dumpert 183 Neb.
568, 162 N.W.2d 520 (1968); Guynan v. Olson, 178 Neb. 335, 133 N.W.2d 571
(1965).
7. See Bartosh v. Schlautman, 181 Neb. 130,147 N.W.2d 492 (1966); Robins v. San-
doz, 177 Neb. 894, 131 N.W.2d 648 (1964); Robins v. Sandoz, 175 Neb. 5, 120
N.W.2d 360 (1963); Thurow v. Schaeffer, 151 Neb. 651, 38 N.W.2d 732 (1949);
Miers v. McMaken, 147 Neb. 133,22 N.W.2d 422 (1946); Fulcher v. Ike, 142 Neb.
418, 6 N.W.2d 610 (1942).
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the judge, as a matter of law, and it is only if reasonable minds
could differ that the defendant is entitled to have the question of
liability go to the jury. Under the range of vision rule there is a
presumption that the judge will decide unless the defendant can
prove that reasonable minds could differ. In light of this standard,
it would seem the range of vision rule is not a specific rule of law at
all, but merely a method of determining when the question of neg-
ligence should be decided by the judge.
If, however, the range of vision rule applies except when the
object is not plainly visible to the driver, then the rule is, in fact, an
established community standard of what constitutes reasonable
conduct.
Since this apparent discrepancy exists in when an exception to
the rule will apply so that the case can be tried to a jury, it is inter-
esting to note how Vrba and Summers fit into the scheme, and to
analyze the present court's interpretation of the effect of the range
of vision rule on the role of the judge and jury.
I. THE RANGE OF VISION RULE
A. Early Cases
The court's decisions in Vrba and Summers clearly indicate an
adherence to the range of vision rule. It is also evident that the
court is attempting to delineate the rule's application to specic fact
situations. However, in order to effectively analyze how Vrba and
Summers fit into the rule's application, it is necessary to first con-
sider the court's development of the range of vision rule.
The range of\vision doctrine as a specific rule of law was origi-
nally adopted by the Nebraska Supreme Court in Roth v.
Blomquist.8 In Roth, plaintiff collided with a horse-driven wagon
owned by defendant. Plaintiff alleged defendant was negligent in
failing to have proper lighting on the wagon. Defendant claimed
plaintiff was contributorily negligent. In reversing a jury verdict
for plaintiff, the Nebraska Supreme Court announced the rule that
a driver has a duty to have strong enough headlights to enable him
to keep sufficient control of his car to stop and avoid an obstruction
within the range of his vision:
This general rule is supported by sound reasons and the overwhelming
weight of authority. When applicable to the facts a violation is of itself
negligence precluding a recovery in favor of the motorist for resulting inju-
ries to himself or to his property. Without such a rule the hazards at farm
and highway crossings and at other places on the lines of public travel
would be unnecessarily and alarmingly increased. There are at night in-
stances in which persons in charge of domestic animals or other property
8. 117 Neb. 444, 220 N.W. 572 (1928).
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suddenly or temporarily, in absence of negligence, obstruct a highway
without opportunity to give drivers of approaching automobiles instant
notice. A farmer in the exercise of due care may return from his own field
at dusk with a team and wagon and cross a highway to his barn.
9
Thus, in Roth plaintiff was deemed contributorily negligent as a
matter of law. Even with the initial adoption of the rule, however,
the court recognized certain exceptions. These exceptions in-
cluded factual situations in which the object or obstruction could
not be seen except at very close range, or in which the object
blended in with the color of the highway.' 0
Seven years later in Cotten v. Stolley,11 Roth was interpreted to
stand for the rule that a motorist was negligent as a matter of law
for driving an automobile so fast on a highway that he could not
stop in time to avoid a collision with an object within the range of
his vision. This clearly established the range of vision rule as a
specific rule of law with a few limited exceptions.
At the time of Roth and Cotten, the necessity for the rule was
probably supported by numerous policy considerations. Highways
bore little relationship to modern thoroughfares, and obstructions
were probably not that uncommon. However, since Roth and
Cotten, advanced technology has drastically changed the role of
the automobile in our society. In light of this change, it is ques-
tionable whether the rule is still sound today. One thing seems
clear, since Cotten the court has struggled with the application of
the rule and has had to formulate appropriate exceptions to meet
these changing circumstances. The rule has remained basically
unchanged, but the development of the exceptions to the rule has
led to confusion and contradictory results.
B. Exceptions to the Rule
One of the first attempts by the court to articulate a general
statement of when an exception to the range of vision rule applied
was in Fulcher v. ike.'2 Plaintiff alleged that the defendant had
9. Id. at 447, 220 N.W. at 572-73.
10. Id. at 447-48, 220 N.W. at 573. The court noted the following exceptions: Day v.
Metropolitan Utils. Dist., 115 Neb. 711, 214 N.W. 647 (1927) (corner of a plat-
form with the narrow edge extending from a drag line over a street car track
and discernable only at close proximity); Frickel v. Lancaster County, 115
Neb. 506, 213 N.W. 826 (1927) (obstruction consisting of a pile of gravel similar
in color to the surface of the highway); Tutsch v. Omaha Structural Steel
Works, 110 Neb. 585, 194 N.W. 731 (1923) (unbarricaded, unknown, open, un-
lighted ditch across a highway that could only be seen at close range and was
not anticipated).
11. 124 Neb. 855, 248 N.W. 384 (1933).
12. 142 Neb. 418, 6 N.W.2d 610 (1942). Defendant testified that because of the
road's topography, he was unable to see plaintiffs vehicle until he was ap-
proximately 80 feet away, a fact which did not allow him sufficient time or
19781
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violated the range of vision rule by striking plaintiff's vehicle from
the rear. The trial court, relying on Roth, held defendant negligent
as a matter of law.
Initially the court outlined the proper Nebraska test for with-
drawing a negligence question from the jury:
In a jury case where different minds may draw different conclusions or
inferences from the adduced evidence, or if there is a conflict in the evi-
dence, the matter at issue must be submitted to the jury, but where the
evidence is undisputed, or but one reasonable inference or conclusion can
be drawn from the evidence, the question is of law for the judge.
1 3
Without discussing the merits of the range of vision rule, the
court then centered on the exceptions to the rule:
It would appear, therefore, that the general rule with exceptions, which
provides that it is negligence as a matter of law for a motorist to drive an
automobile so fast on a highway at night that he cannot stop in time to
avoid a collision with an object within the area lighted by the lamps on the
automobile, should embrace in the exceptions all situations wherein rea-
sonable minds may differ on the question of whether or not the operator of
the automobile exercised the care, caution and prudence required of a rea-
sonably careful, cautious and prudent person under the circumstances of
the particular situation. Any lesser limitation of this general rule would
have the effect of destroying, to that exten4 the fundamental concept of
negligence, and, to that exten of transferring a jury function to the
judge.
14
The court's initial articulation of the rule and its exceptions is con-
fusing. If, as the court stated, the normal standard for determining
whether a negligence question is for the jury or the judge is deter-
minative of when the exceptions apply, it would seem the range of
vision rule is not a separate rule of law at all, but, consistent with
the normal division of the functions of judge and jury.
Following the decision in Fulcher, the court decided the case of
Miers v. McMaken,'5 which aflimed its holding in Fulcher. Plain-
tiff, who was traveling in the same direction as defendant, failed to
observe defendant's vehicle until it was too late to avoid a collision.
Defendant appealed a jury verdict for plaintiff, arguing plaintiff
was contributorily negligent more than slight as a matter of law for
violating the range of vision rule. The supreme court, in conclud-
ing that the trial court was correct in submitting the questions of
negligence and contributory negligence to the jury, noted that de-
space to stop. Plaintiff, on the other hand, claimed defendant should have
seen the vehicle at least 130 feet away.
13. Id. at 423, 6 N.W.2d at 613.
14. Id. at 426, 6 N.W.2d at 615 (emphasis added).
15. 147 Neb. 133, 22 N.W.2d 422 (1946). Defendant testified that while driving
home, he ran out of gas and parked his vehicle on the shoulder with the rear
end partially obstructing the road. Plaintiff traveling in the same direction
was blinded by an oncoming vehicle, and by the time he observed defend-
ant's vehicle, it was too late to stop or turn aside to avoid a collision.
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fendant had alleged a violation of the range of vision rule, and that
plaintiff had alleged facts within the exceptions under Fulcher.
Relying on Fulcher, the court reasoned that this was a situation in
which reasonable minds could differ on the standard of care and,
therefore, it would have been inappropriate for the judge to decide
as a matter of law.16 In Miers it appears the court was simply ap-
plying the normal negligence standard even though it was couched
in terms of an exception to the range of vision rule.
In Thurow v. Schaeffer,17 the Court further emphasized the lim-
ited application of the range of vision rule. In Thurow, the accident
occurred when plaintiff struck defendant's combine from the rear.
Defendant appealed a jury verdict for plaintiff, arguing that the
trial court should have granted him a directed verdict because, as a
matter of law, plaintiff was contributorily negligent for violating
the range of vision rule.18
The court, in upholding the trial court's decision to submit the
issue of negligence to the jury, considered both the normal stan-
dard for submitting negligence questions to the jury, and the stan-
dard under the Fulcher interpretation of the exceptions to the
range of vision rule. It concludech
[The rule was] never intended to be arbitrary... [Its] purpose was to
remove from the jury the question of negligence and to cause it to be de-
terminable as a matter of law only in those cases where the facts were not
in dispute or where they were so conclusive in character that reasonable
minds could not differ in relation thereto. It has been made clear in these
later cases that in cases where the evidence was seriously in dispute and
where reasonable minds might draw different conclusions from the evi-
dence the question of negligence or contributory negligence was not de-
terminable as a matter of law but was for the jury.
19
It could be argued that Schaeffer's interpretation of the range of
vision rule, together with that of Fuicher, makes the rule indistin-
guishable from any other issue of a driver's negligence. Neverthe-
less, the range of vision rule has continued to be referred to in
Nebraska automobile negligence cases as a separate rule of law,
and has led to some inconsistent results.
A good example of the inconsistent results that may follow
when a judge makes a determination as a matter of law instead of
16. Id. at 137, 22 N.W.2d at 424.
17. 151 Neb. 651, 38 N.W.2d 732 (1949). The facts of the case were similar to most
range of vision cases. Defendant had been driving a combine on the highway
when plaintiff came over a hill, attempted to swerve around the combine, but
collided with its rear end. The parties disputed the evidence as to how much
of the road the combine covered, and how far below the hill the combine had
traveled when plaintiff first had an opportunity to observe it.
18. Id. at 653, 38 N.W.2d at 735.
19. Id. at 662, 38 N.W.2d at 738 (emphasis added).
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turning the issue over to the jury is found in Robins v. Sandoz.
20
In Robins, plaintiff had stopped his vehicle on the side of the road
where it was struck from the rear by defendant's vehicle.
21 In up-
holding a jury verdict for defendant on his counterclaim, the court
concluded that even though plaintiff had a temporary right to stop
under Nebraska law,22 the issue of his contributory negligence was
a question for the jury. Furthermore, the question of defendant's
negligence in violating the range of vision rule was also for the
jury. The court reasoned that the facts of Sandoz brought it within
the exceptions to the general range of vision rule because "the evi-
dence is such that reasonable minds might draw different conclu-
sions therefrom." 2 The court believed the jury could very well
have concluded from the evidence either that defendant was not
negligent or plaintiff's negligence was gross in comparison to de-
20. 177 Neb. 894, 131 N.W.2d 648 (1964).
21. 175 Neb. at 12, 120 N.W.2d at 364. There was also an earlier supreme court
appeal of the same case. Robins v. Sandoz, 175 Neb. 5, 120 N.W.2d 360 (1963).
Both decisions arose out of the same fact situation. Plaintiff had stopped
his car on the highway to change a flat tire, and was at the rear of his vehicle
when the accident occurred. Defendant testified that he had met and passed
a vehicle traveling in the other lane approximately 100 feet before meeting
plaintiff's vehicle, and upon seeing plaintiff's vehicle, he only had time to
"whip" the wheel to the left before colliding. There was conflicting evidence
as to whether there were any lights on plaintiffs vehicle, and to the location
of plaintiff's vehicle in relation to the center line and the shoulder of the road.
The case was initially tried to a jury, but at the close of the evidence, the
trial court directed a verdict for plaintiff on the ground that "as a matter of
law.., the plaintiff was guilty of no negligence and the defendant's negli-
gence was the sole cause of plaintiff's damage." Id. at 6, 120 N.W.2d at 361.
The Nebraska Supreme Court reversed on the ground that "there was a dis-
puted question of fact as to whether or not the plaintiff was guilty of negli-
gence which caused or contributed to the collision which question should
have been submitted to a jury for determination." Id. at 11, 120 N.W.2d at 364.
On remand, the jury returned a verdict for defendant on his counterclaim and
plaintiff appealed.
22. NEB. REV. STAT. § 39-757 (Reissue 1960) (repealed LB. 45 § 125, 1973) provides:
No person shall park or leave standing any vehicle, whether attended
or unattended, upon the paved or improved or main traveled portion
of any highway, outside of a business or residence district, when it is
practical to park or leave such vehicle standing off the paved or im-
proved or main traveled portion of such highway Provided, in no
event shall any person park or leave standing any vehicle, whether
attended or unattended, upon any highway unless a clear and unob-
structed width of not less than fifteen feet upon the main traveled
portion of said highway opposite such standing vehicle shall be left
for free passage of other vehicles thereon, nor unless a clear view of
such vehicle may be obtained from a distance of two hundred feet in
each direction upon such highway .... The provisions of this sec-
tion shall not apply to the driver of any vehicle which is disabled
while on the paved or improved or main traveled portion of a high-
way in such manner and to such extent that it is impossible to avoid
stopping and temporarily leaving such vehicle in such position.
23. 177 Neb. at 897, 131 N.W.2d at 650.
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fendants under the comparative negligence standard.24
The initial application of the range of vision rule by the trial
court, and the subsequent jury result demonstrates that the range
of vision rule is contrary to modern standards of driver conduct.
The trial judge attempted to apply a mechanical test for determin-
ing liability, but the jury verdict's measure of the community stan-
dard of conduct demonstrates that the -mechanical test may no
longer be supported by sound policy reasons.
In Guynan v. Olson25 the court stepped back from its former
broad generalization of the exceptions to the range of vision rule,
and attempted to factually categorize when the rule would not ap-
ply. The court, in holding the defendant guilty of negligence as a
matter of law for violating the range of vision rule, noted that past
cases indicated the exceptions had been applied in situations in
which the object struck was the same color as the roadway or, for
some other reason, the object could not be observed by the exer-
cise of due care. The court generalized the exceptions to the rule
by stating.
They generally embrace factual situations involving various factors which
might reasonably be considered to relieve a driver of the duty to see the
object or vehicle in time to avoid it. They deal with situations in which the
driver did not see the object ahead of him until a very short distance
before he was upon it.
2 6
In comparing this case with the prior decisions, the question
posed is whether the court was attempting to limit the application
of the exceptions to the range of vision rule or whether it was sim-
ply trying to distinguish past cases in which the rule had not been
applied.
C. Banosh and Kehm--Criticism of the Rule
Undoubtedly one of the most confusing and controversial range
of vision cases to be decided was that of Bartosh v. Schlautman.27
Three opinions were written in Bartosh and the ultimate effect of
the case on the range of vision rule is unclear. One commentator 28
suggested that Bartosh could possibly be read as the demise of the
rule. Subsequent cases have rejected this reading of the decision,
24. Id.
25. 178 Neb. 335, 133 N.W.2d 571 (1965).
26. Id. at 339, 133 N.W.2d at 574.
27. 181 Neb. 130, 147 N.W.2d 492 (1966). Bartosh arose out of an accident in which
plaintiff had been operating a combine on the highway, and was forced to
stop when the gears of the combine jammed. Plaintiff immediately began
making repairs without placing any flares or lights indicating the combine's
presence. Defendant, traveling in the same direction as plaintiff, struck the
rear of the combine while plaintiff was in the process of repairing it.
28. Schmeling, Vie Range of Vision Rule in Nebraska, 49 NEB. L Rv. 1 (1969).
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but as the commentator concluded, the Bartosh decision, "leaves
the range of vision rule in an extreme state of confusion at best.
'2 9
In Bartosh plaintiff, whose combine was stopped on the road
when struck from the rear by defendant's vehicle, specifically al-
leged a violation of the range of vision rule, and requested a jury
instruction on the rule. Defendant's answer specifically alleged
facts within the exceptions to the rule. At trial defendant at-
tempted to show the highway surface was of a light color and the
color of the combine blended in with the road. He argued that this,
together with the fact that it was twilight, made it very difficult for
him to see the combine. Two witnesses who had passed the com-
bine prior to the accident both testified that the tractor had been
difficult to see. The trial court refused to instruct on the range of
vision rule and instead instructed the jury on the duty of a driver
to keep a proper lookout and control of his vehicle.
30
On appeal from a jury verdict for defendant on his counterclaim
for damages, the supreme court affirmed. In an opinion written by
Judge McCown, the court reasoned that the general rule had been
undercut by numerous exceptions, and pointed out the range of
vision rule was not an "automatic rule of thumb nor a rigid
formula," but rather the application of the rule depended upon in-
dividual circumstances. 31 The court added: "Where an exception
applies, the general rule does not apply. Where the general rule
does not apply as a matter of law, the determination of negligence
is for the jury under the rules and standards of due care under the
particular circumstances as applied in motor vehicle cases. '3 2 The
court held that because an exception to the general rule clearly
applied, the giving of an instruction on the range of vision rule
would have confused the jury and prejudiced the plaintiff.
Chief Justice White, in a dissenting opinion,33 strongly criti-
cized the majority for holding that as a matter of law an exception
to the rule applied. He reasoned that it was for the jury to deter-
mine if the exceptions applied because the question regarding the
29. Id. at 20.
30. The court gave the following jury instruction:
It is the duty of drivers of vehicles to keep such diligent watch and
lookout and have their vehicles under such reasonable control at all
times as will enable them to avoid collision with others, assuming
that such others will also exercise ordinary care .... Each driver
must use such senses of sight and hearing, and such other instru-
ments as are at his command, to use ordinary care to avoid an acci-
dent, and it is the duty of drivers of vehicles to look and see that
which is in plain sight.
181 Neb. at 132, 147 N.W.2d at 494.
31. Id. at 133, 147 N.W.2d at 495.
32. Id. at 134, 147 N.W.2d at 495.
33. Id. at 135, 147 N.W.2d at 496 (White, C.J., dissenting).
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visibility of the combine was the crucial issue in the case. Because
there was evidence supporting a determination either way, the
jury had a right to determine if the combine was clearly visible,
and a further right to know what the applicable law was if the jury
determined that the rule applied rather than an exception.34
Judge Newton, also dissenting,35 agreed the issue of negligence
was for the jury, and stated that the refusal to give an instruction
on the range of vision rule was erroneous. Judge Newton dis-
agreed with the majority's conclusion that the general rule did not
apply as a matter of law. He felt the effect of that conclusion was a
determination by the majority that no jury question was presented
on the issue of the visibility of plaintiff's vehicle, and on the basis
of the majority opinion, a directed verdict for defendant should
have been given.36
Applying the majority opinion's interpretation of the effect of
the range of vision rule in an automobile liability case could leave
four possible alternatives open to a trial judge depending upon the
particular facts. One alternative would be for the trial judge to
conclude that a party was negligent as a matter of law for violating
the range of vision rule. A second alternative would be that if the
trial judge concluded that reasonable minds could differ as to
whether a party violated the rule or whether an exception applied,
the issue would be submitted to the jury with an appropriate range
of vision rule instruction. Third, if the trial judge concluded as a
matter of law the range of vision rule did not apply, the question of
negligence would be submitted to the jury, but no range of vision
rule instruction would be given. Finally, the trial court could con-
clude that a party was simply not negligent and direct a verdict.
The problem with these alternatives is that up to and including
the decision in Bartosh, the court had not been entirely consistent
on when the rule was to be applied as a separate rule of law. This
inconsistency forced trial judges to encroach on the role of the jury
by forcing them to decide additional questions of fact. If nothing
else, one thing appears clear from the Bartosh decision: Chief Jus-
tice White and Judge Newton believed the issue in a range of vi-
sion case is one of visibility. If the object is visible, the rule
applies, and if the object is not visible, the exceptions apply.
The pivotal decision for future range of vision cases appeared to
be Kehm v. Dumpert,37 which followed Bartosh. The views of
Chief Justice White and Judge Newton apparently prevailed in
Kehm, because Judge Newton wrote for the majority, and Judge
34. Id.
35. Id. at 139, 147 N.W.2d at 498 (Newton, J., dissenting).
36. Id.
37. 183 Neb. 568, 162 N.W.2d 520 (1968).
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McCown was forced to write a separate opinion. The facts of the
case were similar to most range of vision cases with defendant
striking plaintiff's vehicle from the rear.38 The majority reasoned
the defendant was guilty of negligence as a matter of law for violat-
ing the range of vision rule because there was no evidence which
would bring him within the exceptions.
Judge McCown, concurring in the result,39 called for abolish-
ment of the range of vision rule as a separate rule of law. He
agreed that a new trial should not have been granted, but had this
to say about the rule:
I disagree with the pronouncement of a flat and rigid rule that it is neg-
ligence, as a matter of law, for a motorist to drive so fast on the highway at
night that he cannot stop in time to avoid collision with an object within
the area lighted by his headlights. The rule was never intended as an au-
tomatic rule of thumb nor a rigid formula to be applied regardless of cir-
cumstances. It is already subject to so many exceptions that it is often
difficult to tell where the rule ends and the exceptions begin.
Where the exceptions embrace (as they do) those situations where
reasonable minds might differ as to whether the motorist was exercising
due care under the particular circumstances, it is difficult to justify the
retention of the old "general rule."
' 4
Judge McCown used the following example to demonstrate the
apparent conflicts encountered in retaining the rule. A motorist
driving approximately 75 miles per hour on the interstate highway
at night with low-beam headlights would be guilty of negligence as
a matter of law for violating the plain vision rule, but if he was
charged with negligence in exceeding the speed limit, the jury
would simply be instructed that violation of the speed limit is not,
in itself, negligence, but may be evidence of negligence.4'
Recent cases considering the range of vision rule indicate that
38. The jury returned a verdict for defendant, but the trial judge ordered a new
trial. Defendant appealed, and the supreme court reversed on the issue of
the trial court's decision to grant a new trial. The majority, however, allowed
defendant to retain the verdict not on the issue of liability but on the issue of
damages. With respect to the damages issue, immediately after the accident,
plaintiff had told defendant she was not hurt, but the next day she consulted
a doctor complaining of a whiplash. Defendant's evidence was based upon a
medical examination conducted prior to trial. Defendant's doctor reported he
could find no whiplash, no abnormalities, and plaintiff was not suffering from
any disability. The doctor also testified plaintiff had consulted him prior to
the accident concerning her back, that she had fallen down a flight of stairs
prior to the accident, that she had fallen on the ice, and that she had fallen
getting out of bed one morning. Based on this, the court felt the jury could
have concluded defendant was not entitled to damages. Id. at 570-71, 162
N.W.2d at 522.
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Judge McCown's position is clearly in the minority.4 2 These cases
represent an adherence to the rule as a separate rule of law, and
there appears to be no trend to eliminate the rule.
It VRBA AND SUMMERS
A. Vrba v. Kelly
In Vrba v. Kelly,43 an action was brought to recover damages to
plaintiff's car as a result of an automobile accident. The defendant
counterclaimed for the damage to his car. The accident occurred
when Vrba's vehicle became stuck in a snowdrift about ninety feet
below the crest of a small hill during a severe snowstorm. Unable
to dig the car out, plaintiff left the car parked on the right side of
the road without placing any flares, without leaving the lights on,
and without giving any other warning of the car's presence. The
next morning, defendant collided with plaintiffs vehicle. At trial,
defendant testified that as he reached the crest of the hill, he was
traveling approximately twenty-five to thirty miles per hour when
his range of vision was suddenly reduced to approximately fifty
feet by blowing snow. When he observed the vehicle, he was un-
able to stop or turn aside in time to avoid the collision.4 4
In reversing the dismissal of plaintiff's claim, the Nebraska
Supreme Court reasoned that defendant was negligent as a matter
of law for violating the range of vision rule. The court noted that
the existence of the adverse weather conditions which affected de-
fendant's range of vision did not excuse his conduct but rather em-
phasized his negligence.4 5 Defendant had argued that plaintiff was
negligent in leaving his vehicle on the public highway without
lights or flares in a place in which there was no clear view for a
distance of 200 feet in each direction, in violation of a Nebraska
statute.4 6 The court, however, held the statute did not apply to
plaintiff because his vehicle was disabled. Relying on Haight v.
Nelson,4 7 the court reasoned that plaintiff substantially complied
42. See Mays v. Siekman, 197 Neb. 77, 247 N.W.2d 613 (1976); Wrasse v. Gustav-
son, 193 Neb. 41, 225 N.W.2d 274 (1975); Botsch v. Reisdorff, 193 Neb. 165, 226
N.W.2d 121 (1975); Duling v. Berryman, 193 Neb. 409, 227 N.W.2d 584 (1975);
McClellen v. Dobberstein, 189 Neb. 669, 204 N.W.2d 559 (1973); O'Conner v.
Kientz, 184 Neb. 554, 168 N.W.2d 703 (1969).
43. 198 Neb. 723, 255 N.W.2d 269 (1977).
44. Id. at 725, 255 N.W.2d at 270. The county court had dismissed plaintiff's claim,
and entered judgment for defendant. On appeal to the district court, both the
claim and counterclaim were dismissed. The Nebraska Supreme Court re-
versed the dismissal of plaintiff's claim, and affirmed the dismissal of defend-
ant's claim.
45. Id. at 725, 255 N.W.2d at 270-71.
46. NEB. REV. STAT. § 36-670(1) (Reissue 1974).
47. 157 Neb. 341, 59 N.W.2d 576 (1953).
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with the requirements of the statute: He had parked as far to the
right as possible, he had left an unobstructed space to pass, and he
was unable to provide a clear view of the vehicle for 200 feet in
either direction because of the weather conditions. The court,
therefore, concluded plaintiff could not have been negligent.48
B. C.C. Natig's Sons, Inc. v. Summers
The same day as Vrba, the court handed down the decision in
C.C. Natvig's Sons, Inc. v. Summers.4 9 The trial court's decision
was based on depositions of plaintiff's driver and defendant's
driver. The driver of plaintiff's vehicle testified that he was travel-
ing about thirty to thirty-five miles per hour during a snowstorm.
He proceeded over a small hill when his visibility was reduced to
approximately sixty feet due to blowing snow. When he observed
defendant's vehicle he was about 200 to 300 feet away, and the vehi-
cle was blocking the entire roadway. His testimony indicated that
it had been difficult to observe defendant's vehicle because it was
"silhouetted" against the white background. He could not go
around the vehicle because there were ditches and banks on both
sides of the road. Plaintiff's driver applied the brakes, but was un-
able to avoid a collision. The driver also indicated he had not seen
any lights on defendant's vehicle nor had he seen any warning sig-
nals indicating the vehicle would be blocking the road.50 Defend-
ant's driver's testimony essentially established that he became
stuck in a snowdrift, and after obtaining the assistance of a nearby
farmer, pulled his vehicle free, momentarily leaving the vehicle
positioned crossways in the center of the highway. It was at this
time that the collision occurred.51
The specific issue before the court was whether plaintiff's driver
by violating the range of vision rule was contributorily negligent
more than slight as a matter of law. The Nebraska Supreme Court
reversed the trial court's verdict for defendant because it con-
cluded there was a factual issue for the jury with respect to
whether plaintiffs driver's negligence was slight compared to the
possible gross negligence of defendant's driver.
5 2
The court reasoned that even though the trial court was correct
in concluding plaintiff's driver was negligent as a matter of law
under the operation of the range of vision rule, the jury was to de-
cide under the Nebraska comparative negligence statute whether
that negligence was slight in comparison to any possible negli-
48. 198 Neb. at 726-27, 255 N.W.2d at 271.
49. 198 Neb. 741, 255 N.W.2d 272 (1977).
50. Id. at 742-43, 255 N.W.2d at 274-75.
51. Id. at 743-44, 255 N.W.2d at 275.
52. Id. at 749, 255 N.W.2d at 277.
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gence on the part of defendant's driver. The court pointed out the
evidence indicated possible active negligence by defendant's
driver in blocking the highway in a place he knew or should have
known was unreasonably dangerous, in failing to place any warn-
ing signals, and in failing to keep a proper lookout. Whether this
constituted negligence, and whether this negligence was gross in
comparison to plaintiff's driver's negligence were questions of fact
making a summary judgment inappropriate.
53
C. Brodkey's Concurrence in rba4
Judge Clinton dissented in Summers5 5 because he was unable
to reconcile the decision with Vrba. Judge Brodkey, who wrote the
majority opinion in Summers, added a concurring opinion to
Vrba 56 in response to Judge Clinton's dissent. Judge Brodkey de-
lineated the apparent inconsistency between Summers and Vrba
by pointing out that in Vrba the court held that defendant was con-
tributorily negligent more than slight as a matter of law for violat-
ing the range of vision rule, whereas in Summers the court held
that the question of the plaintiff's driver's contributory negligence
in violating the range of vision rule was a question for the jury
under the Nebraska comparative negligence statute.5 7 Judge
Brodkey reconciled this inconsistency by reasoning that in Vrba,
plaintiff could not have been negligent; therefore, since defendant
was negligent for violating the range of vision rule, there was no
issue of comparative negligence and judgment for the plaintiff was
proper. In Summers, however, the defendant may have been negli-
gent. Therefore, even though plaintiff was contributorily negligent
as a matter of law for violating the range of vision rule, there still
remained for jury determination the question of whether the negli-
gence was slight in comparison to defendant's possible negligence.
As stated by Judge Brodkey:
Although in some circumstances it may be proper for the trial court to
determine as a matter of law that a person violating the range of vision
rule is guilty of negligence more than slight, so as to prevent recovery,
such as where the other party was not negligent in any respect, yet we
have never held that a driver violating that rule is guilty of negligence
more than slight in every circumstance, regardless of the actions or negli-
gence of the person with whom he collides.
5 8
53. Id.
54. 198 Neb. 723, 727, 255 N.W.2d 269, 271 (1977) (Brodkey, J., concurring).
55. 198 Neb. 741, 749, 255 N.W.2d 272, 277 (1977) (Clinton, T., dissenting).
56. 198 Neb. 723, 727, 255 N.W.2d 269, 271 (1977) (Brodkey, J., concurring).
57. NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1151 (Reissue 1975).
58. 198 Neb. at 728, 255 N.W.2d at 272.
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D. The Rule Today
Vrba and Summers exemplify adherence to the range of vision
rule. They are consistent with the cases since Bartosh which indi-
cate that the crucial issue which decides the application of the
range of vision rule or the exceptions to the rule is the visibility of
the object struck. The court's emphasis on this visibility element
as the controlling issue seems to eliminate any other considera-
tions of whether the operator of the vehicle was exercising the care
and caution of a reasonable person. Thus, it appears that the artic-
ulation in Fulcher and Schaeffer of when the exceptions apply5 9
has been superseded by the visibility issue.
This is evident in Vrba and Summers, for the court no longer
questioned the validity of the rule, but only addressed itself to the
practical effect of a violation of the rule. Apparent in these opin-
ions is a further mechanization of the range of vision rule as a sep-
arate rule of law. Under these decisions, it appears that if there is
no question as to visibility of the object, a violation of the range of
vision rule will automatically make a plaintiff contributorily negli-
gent, with the only issue left to the jury being the determination of
the ratio of that negligence to defendant's negligence.
IV. RULES OF LAW
Negligence is conduct that fails to measure up to an acceptable
standard. The standard employed in the law of torts is that of a
reasonably prudent person acting under the same or similar cir-
cumstances. Whether or not the standard has been attained is nor-
mally a jury question, and only under the most extreme situations,
in which reasonable minds could not differ upon the facts or the
inferences to be drawn therefrom, can the case be taken from the
jury. If honest differences of opinion between persons of average
intelligence exist, the issue should not be resolved by the courts.
60
With this general standard in mind, the concept of negligence
law in automobile negligence cases must also be interpreted in
light of the common law system of stare decisis. The decision of an
appellate court that under certain circumstances a particular type
of conduct is clearly negligent, or not negligent, or that the issue is
for the jury as one on which reasonable persons may differ, estab-
lishes a precedent for other cases in which the facts are identical,
or substantially the same. To that extent, it may define the stan-
dard of reasonable conduct which the community requires. 6 ' This
59. See notes 17-19 & accompanying text supra.
60. See, e.g., McKinney v. Yelavich, 352 Mich, 687, 90 N.W.2d 883 (1958). For Ne-
braska cases, see note 7 & accompanying text supra.
61. W. PROSSER, TORTS 188 (4th ed. 1971).
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is what the Nebraska Supreme Court has done with the range of
vision rule. It has crystallized the law into mechanical rules, and
has treated past precedents as fixing definite rules of uniform ap-
plication. But as some of the cases indicate, the rule has been ab-
rogated by the necessity of applying the standard to the particular
circumstances.
The exercise of caution in formulating specific standards of con-
duct or rules of law was suggested by Dean Roscoe Pound:
Standards are late developments in law. Thus the standards of the Ro-
man law belong to the classical period; the standard of due care in our law
of negligence is the work of the nineteenth century, and the standards of
reasonable service and reasonable facilities in our law of public utilities
were not understood until the end of the last century. Moreover, nine-
teenth-century courts distrusted these standards and sought to put them
into straitjackets. Degrees of negligence, attempts to lay down that this or
that was negligence "as a matter of law," and the "stop, look and listen"
rule bear witness to distrust of standards and desire to subject conduct to
fixed detailed rules. But elimination of circumstances in order to get a
rule makes the rule impossible as a practical compromise between the in-
terests of the several participants in the infinitely variable situations of
human conduct. In framing standards of conduct the law seeks neither to
generalize by eliminating the circumstances nor to particularize by in-
cluding them; instead, the law seeks to formulate the general expectation
of society as to how individuals will act in the course of their undertak-
ings, and thus to guide the common sense or expert intuition of jury or
comnmission when called on to judge a particular conduct under particular
circumstances.
62
The "stop, look and listen" rule referred to by Dean Pound is a
classic example of the need to exercise caution in framing stand-
ards of behavior that amount to rules of law. The rule stemmed
from the case of Baltimore & Ohio Railway v. Goodman. Plaintiff
approached a railroad crossing, and being unable to see an ap-
proaching train because of an obstruction, proceeded across the
tracks and was struck by the train. The United States Supreme
Court held the plaintiff contributorily negligent as a matter of law.
Mr. Justice Holmes writing for the majority announced the "stop,
look, listen, and get out" rule:
In such circumstances it seems to us that if a driver cannot be sure other-
wise whether a train is dangerously near he must stop and get out of his
vehicle, although obviously he will not often be required to do more than
to stop and look . . .. It is true... that the question of due care very
generally is left to the jury. But we are dealing with a standard of conduct,
and when the standard is clear it should be laid down once for all by the
courts. 64
Although the standard of conduct required of a driver seemed
clear to Justice Holmes, that rule of law was short lived, and was
62. 44 REPORTS OF AMERIcAN BAR AssOcIATION 445, 456-57 (1919).
63. 275 U.S. 66 (1927).
64. Id. at 70 (citations omitted).
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overruled only seven years later in Pokora v. Wabash Railway,65
in an opinion written by Justice Cardozo.
The present status of the range of vision rule raises the same
questions as those presented by the "stop, look and listen rule."
Even though the standard of conduct may have been very clear to
the Nebraska Supreme Court in 1926 when it originally adopted
the rule, the policy considerations and existing circumstances may
not be the same today. Perhaps the doctrine of stare decisis has
locked the court into a rule that disregards the changes in particu-
lar fact circumstances resulting in a rule undercut by so many ex-
ceptions that the rule is no longer necessary. The rule itself has
taken from the jury its primary function of determining what is an
appropriate standard of conduct and turned that function over to
the judge to base his or her decision on particular rules of law.
V. CONCLUSION
One commentator 66 has suggested three possible alternatives
to the range of vision rule. One alternative would be that a viola-
tion of the range of vision rule would not make a driver negligent
as a matter of law, but would merely be evidence to be considered
by the jury in deciding the case.67 A second alternative would be
to do away with the range of vision concept altogether and deter-
mine the issue of the driver's negligence by reference to other
rules of the road or statutes such as "a speed reasonably prudent
under existing conditions. ' 68 A third alternative would be to deter-
mine just what cases merit application of the rule. This would be
done by modifying the rule to add a separate condition that the
driver violating the rule has the right to assume that all persons
using the highway will observe the law.6 9 Under this third alterna-
tive, the test of whether the rile was applicable would not be
whether the object was visible, but rather whether the object
struck was illegally placed and maintained or illegally driven upon
the highway.
7 0
Although that commentator concluded that the third alterna-
tive was the most viable in Nebraska, the first alternative would
best eliminate any problems inherent in a specific rule of law. It
would prevent a judge from deciding issues of negligence as a mat-
ter of law and turn that function over to the jury. Furthermore, it
would not weaken the rule nor create a void because the rule
65. 292 U.S. 98 (1934).
66. Schmeling, supra note 28, at 1.
67. Id. at 33.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 34.
70. Id.
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would be replaced by the normal standard for deciding when a
case should be decided as a matter of law and when it should be
left to the jury. This would eliminate any fear that the jury might
find a driver against whom the rule is applied non-negligent in
cases in which the driver is clearly at fault.
The merits of this standard would be (1) the elimination of con-
fusion among trial courts as to when the rule is to be applied, (2)
the elimination of confusion in instructing the jury as to the rule
and its exceptions, (3) the return to the real issue in the case-the
negligence of the driver and not the question of visibility, and (4)
the return to the jury of its true function in an automobile negli-
gence case, that is, to compare defendant's conduct with that of an
ordinary reasonable person under the same or similar circum-
stances to determine if defendant fell below the acceptable stan-
dard of conduct of the community.
Tim Engler '79

